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Abstract—In recent years Integrated Full Electric Propulsion 
(IFEP) has become a popular power system concept within the 
marine community, both for the naval and the commercial 
community. In this paper the authors discuss the need for a 
detailed investigation into the impact of different IFEP power 
system architectures on the availability of power and hence on the 
survivability of the vessel. The power system architectures 
considered here could relate to either a commercial or a naval 
vessel and include radial, ring and hybrid AC/DC arrangements.  
Comparative fault studies of the architectures were carried out 
in an attempt to make valuable observations on the survivability 
of a vessel.  Simulation results demonstrate that the ring and 
hybrid AC/DC architectural contribute to a higher survivability 
than the radial architecture. However, there are still challenges 
that need to be addressed and therefore potential solutions such 
as fault current limiters will be considered. 
 
Index Terms—Marine technology, power distribution, power 
system availability, power system protection. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE introduction of Integrated Full Electric Propulsion 
(IFEP), and its associated characteristics such as higher 
generation and load levels, variable modes of operation, and 
the implementation of power electronics and novel loads, has 
resulted in a need for marine electrical system engineers to 
reconsider protection and reconfiguration philosophies. The 
presently adopted protection philosophy is mainly based on 
commonly used radial network architectures with coordinated 
overcurrent protection. 
 An example of a typical IFEP challenge can be illustrated 
through the fact that sometimes as little as 10% of the installed 
generation capacity may be used for a significant time 
duration, due to operational requirements; this may cause 
problems in terms of satisfying protection criteria such as 
speed and sensitivity, as the prospective fault levels will 
change in proportion with the connected generation. Also, 
reconfiguration of IFEP systems has become an area of interest 
over recent years. This is particularly true for the naval 
shipping industry where Fight Through Power (FTP) 
capabilities for naval vessels are essential for battle situations 
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[1]. In [1] naval vessel survivability is defined as a 
combination of avoiding a threat (susceptibility), withstanding 
a casualty (vulnerability) and recovering from a casualty 
(recoverability). This paper will focus on the vulnerability and 
recoverability. The vulnerability and recoverability can be 
represented in a 3D model as illustrated in Fig. 1 [2]. 
 Point (1,1,1) represents the maximum survival state of the 
vessel, in which a naval vessel can fight unrestricted with all 
its available systems [2]. This model consists of three 
components including “structural integrity” (bottom surface), 
“battle systems” (front surface) and “mobility systems” (left 
surface). As IFEP systems provide power for propulsion and 
radar systems that are related to “mobility systems” and “battle 
systems”, any degradation of the delivering of power to these 
components has a significant impact on the vessel’s 
survivability. Network architecture is therefore a critical 
element in assessing survivability.  
In commercial applications, survivability may also be 
influenced by a non-combat related incident, e.g. a short-
circuit fault on the network, the tripping of a gas 
turbine/generator, etc. Such non-combat incidents can also 
affect naval vessels. A similar 3D model as in Fig. 1 can be 
used for commercial applications as well where “battle 
systems” can be replaced by just navigational equipment such 
as radar.  
 
Fig. 1.  Survivability state components after hit [2] 
  
A number of alternative IFEP power system architectures 
have been discussed such as radial and ring [3] [4]. In [4] and 
[5], hybrid power system architectures are considered, where 
there is a combination of AC and DC distribution. In addition, 
different configurations of commonly used radial and ring 
architectures have also been presented [6]. Although numerous 
IFEP power system architectures exist and have been 
proposed, little discussion has been conducted with respect to 
the impact of different architectures on system protection and 
reconfiguration. This has the potential to affect the availability 
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 of electrical power and therefore the survivability of the vessel 
(Fig. 1). 
 
As indicated in [2], quantification of survivability is difficult 
if not infeasible. It has therefore been suggested that a relative 
comparison would be more appropriate [2]. Therefore three 
IFEP power system architectures; a commonly used radial 
architecture, a ring and a hybrid AC/DC will be compared 
against each other in order to ascertain their respective 
survivability contributions to vessels. Although 3 architectures 
are considered here, other existing and concept architectures 
can be included in a similar study. In the following sections of 
the paper, an introduction to the 3 architectures will be 
discussed. Simulation results from behavioral models for each 
of the architectures will be used. 
II. POWER SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES FOR IFEP 
Table 1 presents examples of each of the three architectures, 
with references to actual applications of these architectures. 
 
TABLE 1 IFEP ARCHITECTURE EXAMPLES 
 Radial Hybrid Ring 
Application Military/Commercial Military Military/Commercial 
Example Type 45 [4][7] DDG1000 
[8] 
RFA Sir Bedevere 
[3] 
 
A. Radial Architecture 
A typical modern electric ship architecture follows the 
radial design [6] with MV connected generation units in large 
capacity systems; generation may be connected at LV in 
smaller capacity applications. Fig. 2 represents one “half” of a 
typical marine radial architecture. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Radial IFEP Architecture 
 
 Overcurrent protection is commonly used for such 
architectures. This approach relies on inverse time-current 
relays that protect each feeder in the system. All relays in the 
system should be set to operate in a coordinated fashion. 
Therefore, faults on a lower feeder level will be cleared by the 
relays on this level before the feeder protection at a higher 
level will attempt to clear this fault on backup. 
B. Ring Architecture 
Fig. 3 represents one “half” of a typical ring main 
architecture where multiple generation sources are connected 
in parallel. This architecture can be found on vessels such as 
offshore supply vessels with Dynamic Positioning (DP) 
equipment [10]. Rules and regulations allow DP class 3 [11] 
operation with closed tie breakers, provided that a fault can be 
detected and isolated before healthy parts of the system are 
tripped.  
 
Fig. 3.  Ring IFEP Architecture 
 
In the case of a fault on this architecture, alternative paths 
can be used to maintain supply to other parts of the systems. 
Such architectures possess multiple sources and fault current 
flows can be bi-directional, depending on fault location; 
therefore protecting such systems can be relatively complex 
and may require the use of directional relays. However, after 
reconfiguration, where the supply paths may have changed, the 
protection configuration and settings may require re-
evaluation. This may present challenges and more effective 
solutions must be considered.  
C. Hybrid Architecture 
Within the marine community there has been a debate for 
some time regarding DC versus AC power distribution systems 
[3], [4], [5], [8], [9]. The use of DC distribution offers certain 
advantages over AC distribution such as higher power 
transfers for similar voltages, unity power factor, no frequency 
synchronization for connecting ac systems coupled via a DC 
bus, no AC noise coupling, etc.  
Associated disadvantages of DC power distribution systems 
such as no zero crossing to aid fault interruption, weight and 
cost, means that in many cases AC remains the first choice for 
marine power systems. However, if cost is not the dominating 
factor, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages of DC 
distribution systems; this can be seen in modern applications 
such as space- and fighter crafts and naval vessels where DC is 
used [8]. 
However, most naval mission systems, such as Electro 
Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), weapons 
systems, communications and radar systems, require a DC 
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 supply. This is also the case for future high power weapon 
systems such as rail guns and lasers [8]. Furthermore, the 
breaking of DC fault currents has always been very difficult, 
although research into electro-mechanical hybrid and solid- 
state current interruption has shown promising results [12]. 
Papers [4] and [5] suggest the use of a hybrid IFEP power 
system (Fig. 4.), consisting of both AC and DC distribution 
systems. In this case, the AC distribution subsystem is used to 
distribute energy from the generator sets to the propulsion 
motors. Each DC zone can be supplied through either of the 2 
supply paths in order to improve redundancy. 
 Paper [8] mentions the use of an Integrated Fight Through 
Power (IFTP) system for the US DDG-1000 destroyer 
program where a 60Hz, 4160VAC system provides power for 
the propulsion system; IFTP rectifiers supply a 1000 VDC 
distribution system for other vessel loads.  
This hybrid architecture presents research challenges in 
terms of system protection and reconfiguration. For example, 
faults in the DC network may cause very high fault current 
peaks due to stored energy within capacitors used for voltage 
smoothing purposes. 
 
Fig. 4.  Hybrid AC/DC IFEP Architecture 
III. POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION  
Anecdotal evidence has shown that on modern ships, 
spurious tripping and mal-operations do occur. To limit the 
impact of excessive fault currents, devices such as Super-
conducting Fault Current Limiters (SFCL) and series-in line 
reactors have been researched and demonstrated. Such 
devices, and the increasing use of power electronic devices, 
will act to reduce fault current levels and this has the potential 
to cause problems for power system protection discrimination 
and operation.   
A. Power Converters 
Coordination of protection across the AC/DC interface and 
ensuring converter device protection acts in harmony with the 
power system protection is also a challenge that must be 
addressed.  Power converter devices consist of semiconductors 
of which the thermal mass is low. This means that an over 
current will cause the temperature to rise rapidly beyond its 
safe limit. Since mechanical breakers often rely on clearing the 
fault at a subsequent current zero, this method is too slow to 
protect the semiconductors. To protect the semiconductor from 
overcurrents, fuses are used which are faster then the 
mechanical breakers [13].  However, if the converter is in the 
path between a faulted section and the rest of the system, the 
fuses may act before the power system protection can act, 
which should be the case to preserve system integrity and 
protection system discrimination.  
B. Fault Current Limiters 
To limit fault currents, devices such as SFCL and series in-
line-reactors can be used [6]. Conventional power system 
protection methods are based on overcurrent protection. 
However, fault level limiters such as SFCLs will make it 
difficult to establish a distinction between faults and other 
“natural” phenomena such as motor starts and inrush currents 
associated with transformer energisation. Unit protection based 
methods such as differential protection may be used but 
overcurrent backup protection will still have the same 
problems as aforementioned. Furthermore, excessively limited 
fault current may result in slow or non-operation of 
conventional current-based protection systems. 
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
In order to assess the impact of the different IFEP 
architectures on the survivability of the vessel, a comparative 
study has been carried out. The aim of this study has been to 
compare the fault current peaks for different IFEP 
architectures when a fault is applied. To make a fair 
comparative study, the total installed generation capacity is the 
same for each of the three architectures, which in this case 
constitutes 4 generator units.  All three architectures used the 
same data and ratings in terms of generator, transformer, load, 
etc. Table 2 presents an overview of the data used in the 
models. Generator preset models were used to obtain realistic 
data such as generator reactances and rotor inertia. The system 
models were developed and simulated in SimPowerSystems, a 
toolbox within Matlab/Simulink® [14] 
 
TABLE 2 COMMON IFEP MODEL PARAMETERS 
Generators 10MVA, 6.6kV 
Fixed MV load 5MW, pf0.85 
Fixed LV load 2.125MW, pf0.85 
Transformer (Dyn) 3MVA, 6.6kV/0.44kV 
Leakage inductance transformer 0.045p.u. 
6.6kV cable (per phase); 10,20m 0.22988 Ω/km 
0.44kV cable (per phase); 10m 0.148 Ω/km 
 
For comparative analysis of the performance of each system 
under fault conditions, a three-phase fault was applied to the 
LV side of the radial and ring system. A positive to negative 
fault was applied to the LV DC side of the hybrid system. Only 
the fault on the hybrid system was cleared in order to see the 
regulating action of the rectifier controller. 
The three-phase fault condition is the worst-case scenario in 
terms of fault levels; therefore these fault conditions were used 
in the case studies in this paper. Although these fault 
conditions are rare, these conditions are credible and are 
encountered in practice. The letters in Fig. 5, Fig. 10, and Fig. 
15 are used to illustrate the locations where measurements 
have been taken and to represent the applied fault locations.  
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 Both the radial and the hybrid AC/DC architecture model 
have 2 generators since in this case study only one “half” of 
the network with in total 4 generators is modeled; for these 
architectures it has been assumed to operate the network with 
an open tie breaker. In order to model a ring architecture 
involving the entire network, the model contains all 4 
generators. 
A. Performance of the radial architecture 
1) Simulation procedure and results 
The radial architecture (one half of the split running system) 
was modeled as shown in Fig. 5. A three phase fault was 
applied at location D at time t=1s. The simulation results 
relating to this are presented in Fig. 6 to Fig. 9.  
 
Fig. 5.  Radial IFEP Architecture with Fault 
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Fig. 6.  L-L voltages at location A 
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Fig. 7.  Currents at location A 
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Figure 8 Currents at location B 
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Fig. 9.  Currents at location C 
 
2) Comments and observations 
The voltage drop as shown in Fig. 6 is approximately 22%. 
The currents are presented in Table 3 where “Ipeak” is the peak 
current due to the fault and “factor” represents Ipeak as a 
multiple of the nominal current.  
 
TABLE 3 RADIAL CURRENTS 
Location A B C 
Ipeak (kA) 2.8 5.26 78 
factor 5.4 18 17.8 
 
The currents are considerable and the level depends on the 
impedance between the fault and on the nature of the energy 
source. Other studies conducted by the authors have revealed 
fault currents in excess of 200kA peak for high-capacity 
marine power systems. As expected, the corresponding voltage 
close to the fault location collapses to almost 0, not shown in 
the paper. There is also a depressing impact on the MV 
voltage, but this is buffered through the impedance of the 
transformer in the fault current path. This is shown in Fig. 6 
and Fig. 7. Not shown in this paper is the current of the LV 
load which collapses, the degree of collapse depending on the 
fault path impedance.  
The approximate voltages and currents drop of the MV load 
are 22% and 18% respectively (plots not shown). 
B. Performance of the ring architecture 
1) Simulation procedure and results 
The IFEP ring architecture has been modeled with 4 
generators as shown in Fig. 10. The reason to have 4 
generators has been explained at the beginning of this section. 
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 At time t=1s, a three phase fault was applied on the LV side at 
location F. 
 
Fig. 10. Ring IFEP Architecture with Fault 
 
Since the ring architecture is symmetrical in length and 
therefore in cable impedance, the voltages and currents 
observed at B and C should be essentially equal. The 
simulation results relating to this architecture are presented in 
Fig. 11 to Fig. 14. 
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Fig. 11. L-L voltages at location A 
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Fig. 12. Currents at location A 
 
2) Comments and observations 
The voltage drop in Fig. 11 due to the LV fault is 
approximately 14%. Similar voltage drops can be observed at 
location B, C, D and other generators although not shown in 
this paper. Some of the currents in the system are represented 
in Table 4 where E represents the fault current. 
 
TABLE 4 RING CURRENTS 
Location A B D E 
Ipeak (kA) 1.726 3.265 6.53 103 
factor 6.6 22 21.8 23.4 
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Fig. 13. Currents at location D 
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Fig. 14. Currents at location E 
 
Although not shown in this paper, the MV load voltage and 
current drops are both approximately 14%. 
Furthermore, the potential for bi-directional current flow in 
such architectures may result in a more complex protection 
solution being required. This would be the case if a fault 
would occur on the MV bus in Fig. 10. Problems with fault 
level variability due to different proportions of generation 
being in-service and different ring configuration being used 
may also be experienced.   
C. Performance of the hybrid AC/DC architecture 
1) Simulation procedure and results 
Fig. 15 represents (one half of the split running system) a 
hybrid AC/DC IFEP architecture. A 6-pulse controlled 
thyristor rectifier was used to control the DC voltage. A 
capacitor with a value of 0.05F was used to smooth the voltage 
output. At time t=1s, a positive to negative DC rail bus fault 
was applied (location F); after 100ms the fault was cleared.  
 
Fig. 15. Hybrid AC/DC IFEP Architecture with Fault 
 
Fig. 16 shows a block diagram for the control system of the 
thyristor subsystem. The DC voltage Vdc is measured and 
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 compared with the required DC voltage; Vdc*. The output of 
the pulses block regulates the firing angle, α, which in turn 
determines the average voltage Vdc. For rectifier operation 
where a negative Vdc is to be avoided, α can not be more than 
90°. Therefore the output of the PI controller is limited 
between 0° and 90°. 
 
Fig. 16. Control scheme for thyristor 
 
 This simulation results are shown in Fig. 17 to Fig. 23. 
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Fig. 17. L-L voltages at location A 
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Fig. 18. Currents at location A 
0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
Time (s)
Vo
lta
ge
 
(V
)
 
Fig. 19  Currents at location B 
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Fig. 20. Currents at location C 
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Fig. 21. Fault Current at location F 
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Fig. 22. DC voltage at location D 
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Fig. 23. DC current at location D 
 
2) Comments and observations 
It can be noticed from Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 that the impact of 
a fault at the LV side on the MV side is not as severe as is the 
case for the radial and ring architectures.  
Not shown in this paper are the voltage and current drops of 
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Vdc*  Pulses 
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 the MV load; there is a short (10ms) voltage and current drop 
of approximately 11% and 8% respectively. About 10ms after 
the fault occurs, the MV load voltage increases to a value 
which is approximately 3% more then the nominal voltage. 
The voltage levels are restored after the fault is cleared. This 
voltage profile is similar to the voltage profile at location A, 
Fig. 17 
Table 5 represents the peak currents at several locations in 
the system as illustrated in Fig. 15. “E” and “F” are the 
capacitor and peak fault current respectively. 
 
TABLE 5 HYBRID CURRENTS 
Location A B C 
Ipeak (kA) 1.26 1.95 26.9 
factor 2.2 4.8 5.1 
 E F Thyristor 
Ipeak (kA) 41.5 38.4 41.6 
 
Fig. 21 shows the peak fault current at location F, which is 
of the order of 38kA due to the instantaneous discharge of the 
stored energy within the capacitor into the short circuit. This 
represent a significant challenge and fault containment, energy 
dissipation and voltage surge arresting technologies may be 
required to mitigate against such high-energy discharges. The 
oscillations in Fig. 21 are due to the interaction between the 
capacitance and inductance in the system. Fig. 22 and Fig. 23 
show the DC bus bar voltage and current respectively. 
 
Not shown are the thyristor peak fault currents of 41.6 kA, 
which may cause fuses inside the converter to trip. As 
explained before, a fuse trip in the converter may cause 
spurious tripping and mal-operation of the power system 
protection.  
 After the fault is cleared at t= 1.1s, the system takes 
approximately 0.2s to regulate the voltage back to the desired 
value. This is due to the saturation of the PI controller. Vdc 
experiences oscillation with an overshoot of 27% before it 
settles as shown in Fig. 22. As the circuit is inductive, a 
freewheel diode was connected parallel to the load. 
D. Comparison of architectures 
 Table 6 compares the three IFEP architectures for faults 
on the LV side of the system. The radial architecture was used 
as a benchmark since this is the most commonly used 
architecture at present. All results have been normalized with 
respect to the results of the radial architecture. The letter 
behind the value refers to the measurement point of that 
particular architect; either in Fig. 5, Fig. 10 and Fig. 15.   
 
TABLE 6 COMPARISON  OF  IFEP ARCHITECTURES 
Architecture Radial Hybrid Ring 
Current levels LV 1 (C) 0.49 (F)  1.32 (E) 
Current levels MV 1 (B) 0.37 (B) 1.24 (D) 
Voltage drop MV load 18-22% 8-11% 14% 
Criteria comparison 
Protection system  0 - - 
Vulnerability (PV) 0 0 0 
Recoverability (PR) 0 + + 
Comparing the radial with the ring architecture, the peak 
fault currents on the LV and MV side are higher for the ring 
architecture; a factor 1.32 and 1.24 times respectively as 
illustrated in Table 6. This is because of an increased number 
of generators and reduced fault path impedance due to 
parallelism within the network. As more power is available in 
the ring network than in the radial network, the MV side and 
therefore the MV load seems to be affected less than it is the 
case with the radial network. This can be concluded from the 
comparison of the MV load voltage and current drops which is 
18-22% and 14% for the radial and ring architecture 
respectively. As MV load will include propulsion power, it can 
be seen from Fig. 1 that “mobility systems” play an important 
part in the survivability of a vessel. 
 The hybrid AC/DC architecture has a lower LV and MV 
peak fault current than the radial architecture, a factor 0.49 and 
0.37 less respectively. The MV load voltage and current drops 
of 11% and 8% respectively are less than that of the radial and 
ring architecture.   
Criteria such as vulnerability and recoverability have also 
been subjectively compared against the radial architecture 
which was given the baseline value of 0.  This comparison as 
illustrated in Table 6 will be discussed below. 
In terms of protection challenges, the radial architecture 
requires the least complex protection system, as overcurrent 
protection may well be sufficient. This in contrast to the hybrid 
AC/DC architecture which suffers from issues relating to DC 
fault current breaking and converter protection. Also the 
protection for the ring is more complicated than the protection 
for the radial architecture as bi-directional protection will be 
required for faults on the MV bus.  The hybrid AC/DC and 
ring are given the same protection complexity level as a 
comparison between these two architectures would be too 
arbitrary.  
Assessment of the vulnerability of each of the architectures 
is difficult at this stage. Equipment such as power converters 
are mounted on shock absorbing devices so they should 
withstand a certain level of shock for example due to a missile 
hit. However, damage to auxiliary equipment such cooling 
systems may damage systems such as power converters and 
transformers. All of these systems can be found on either of 
the architectures. 
In terms of recoverability both the ring and hybrid AC/DC 
architecture offer advantages over the radial architecture. If for 
example the cabling on one side of the vessel is damaged, the 
power can be rerouted to the healthy other part of the network. 
Assuming the susceptibility (PX) and vulnerability (PV) are 
equal for all three architectures, the survivability (PS) [2] can 
be expressed as (1) where PR is the recoverability. 
 
( )( )RVXS PPPP −−= 1..1           (1) 
 
From Table 6 and (1), it can be seen that without knowing 
the vulnerability and susceptibility, the PS is already higher for 
the ring and hybrid AC/DC architecture than the PS for the 
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V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Devices such as SFCLs, in-line-reactors, fuses, etc. can be 
used as fault-containment and limiting devices. However, these 
devices may disrupt the proper operation of the power system 
protection. Investigation into what degree the fault currents 
should be reduced (if at all) are necessary to establish a 
balance between possible damage due to high fault levels and 
the use of current limiters which may result in improper 
operation of the power system protection.  
Further investigation into the propagation of damage to the 
loads due to a fault is required; in particular for DC systems as 
sensitive equipment will be connected to the DC bus. 
Apart from using devices that limit/contain fault levels, 
investigations must also focus on removing the cause of 
excessive fault levels. For example, removing or reducing the 
value of the smoothing capacitor in the hybrid architecture 
may reduce the fault current peak, but this may require 
alternative converter technologies to be used. 
Investigation into adaptive or predictive protection settings 
in combination with reconfiguration methods is also necessary 
to improve the survivability of vessels. In particular this is true 
for ring architectures where there are multiple fault current 
paths possible and in situations where fault currents may be 
subject to very wide variation depending on the prevailing 
generation and system configuration. 
Lastly, the electro-mechanical interactions of large prime 
movers and loads must also be considered during fault 
conditions to ensure that they do not have a detrimental effect 
on the operation of protection systems.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The study has shown that both the ring and the hybrid 
AC/DC architecture have a higher survivability than the radial 
architecture. If taking into account the DC advantages as 
aforementioned and the results of the fault study, the hybrid 
AC/DC architecture seems to be the favorable architecture 
over the ring architecture. 
However, challenges such as protection coordination and 
high peak fault currents need to be addressed.  Solutions may 
be found in combining architectures and using devices such as 
SFCLs and surge arresters. This offers scope for further 
research as the relative comparison approach outlined in this 
paper can be used to evaluate the impact of the suggested 
solutions on the vessel’s survivability. 
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